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I. INTRODUCTION
Time is not costless in the context of global warming legislation, and so
the longer it takes society to address global warming, the harder it will be to
do so.1 Nevertheless, in 2010 Richard J. Lazarus, a professor at Harvard Law
School, declared that “political pundits of every stripe are writing climate
change legislation’s obituary.”2 The United States has already fallen behind
other established democracies in the European Union in addressing this
issue.3 Climate change is an important problem that affects both our natural
resources and water supply,4 so why has it been so difficult to address?
Section II of this Article explores some basics of climate change
legislation, in order to establish a foundation. Section III examines some of
the most important federal and state climate change laws. Section IV
discusses litigation as a potential alternative to addressing climate change
through state and federal legislation. Section V explores several major
problems associated with climate change, and Section VI proposes solutions
for each. Section VII provides several recommendations for drafting lasting,
effective climate change and for the substance of said legislation. The scope

*

**
1.
2.
3.
4.

The author acknowledges that the scope of this article may seem problematic at first glance. How
can one paper provide a succinct and holistic look at climate change legislation? Climate change
is a complex, multifarious problem, and addressing only one facet leaves any discussion incomplete.
However, there is only so much space allotted for a typical law review article. This Article is
intended not only to educate those unfamiliar with many problems facing proponents of climate
change legislation, but also to offer solutions to those problems. In order to do that, this Article
examines the manner in which past legislation has successfully been implemented as well as the
goals of well-known climate change advocates. Each piece was included to illuminate part of the
debate surrounding climate change, in order to shed light on this topic as a whole. Finally, the
author would like to note that this Article was not written in order to endorse any one particular
viewpoint with respect to climate change, but only to clarify often-cited problems and solutions in
passing climate change legislation.
University of Louisville-Brandeis School of Law, J.D., Magna Cum Laude, 2014. Thanks to
Nicholas Craddock and Professor Thomas Fitzgerald.
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009).
Richard J. Lazarus, Climate Change Law In and Over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY
L. 29, 30 (2010).
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1190.
Robin K. Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate
Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 15–16 (2010).

231

232

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

of this Article is intentionally broad in order to address climate change
legislation holistically.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
Climate change legislation generally falls into two broad categories:
mitigation and adaptation.5 Mitigation legislation seeks to reduce the
emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change.6 Mitigation
strategies primarily affect transportation and electric industries, but may
affect others as well, including manufacturing.7 Adaptation legislation
responds to the effects of climate change in order to ensure the continued
viability of human and animal life, in case efforts to mitigate climate change
are unsuccessful.8
David L. Markell, a professor at Florida State University College of
Law, notes that any new climate legislation must include efforts to preserve
life for humans and animals in the face of climate change.9 Addressing this
problem, however, requires asking certain normative questions: which
components of climate change should be addressed, and how?10 Any remedy
would be at least partially inadequate, because climate change affects the
world in ways that humans cannot completely mitigate.11 Robin Craig, a
professor at S.J. Quinney College of Law, hypothesized that climate change’s
impact on the globe has already gone too far for humans to control much of
the environment’s reactions; therefore, passing adaptation legislation has
increased in importance.12 How to implement adaptation climate change
legislation will perhaps become more clear, through the process of trial and
error, once more legislation is passed containing both adaptation and
mitigation strategies. It is also possible that environmentalists in Congress
could use different approaches to address this problem as “bargaining chips”
in the negotiation phase of legislation. The private sector might be reluctant
to pass certain types of remedies for climate change, but more willing to pass
others.13 Whatever the future of climate change legislation, those who draft
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climate change legislation should consider potential alternatives when
addressing the causes and effects of climate change.
III. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
Both the federal government and state governments have enacted
climate change legislation. Climate change legislation is unique because the
most significant changes happen from the “bottom up,” since state legislation
can spur change at the federal level.14 However, state action alone is unlikely
to sufficiently address problems with climate change.15
A. Federal Legislative Efforts
Climate change law is a rapidly changing field, and only recently has
the United States Congress enacted legislation to abate it.16 One of the oldest
debates in climate change legislation deals with whether a federal regulatory
“floor” is necessary.17 There are two reasons generally proffered for why a
federal floor might be needed.18 First, allowing each state to decide whether
to set their own standards could create a national “race to the bottom,” which
would provide standards for greenhouse gas emissions far below those of
other countries.19 Second, the migration of pollution from one state to
another might provide motivation for the government to address climate
change nationally, as this problem is unlikely to be solved on the state level
alone.20 Though these two theories help explain why there is a national push
for climate change legislation, this is only part of the debate. As discussed
below, regulation at the state level is unlikely to cover a large enough area to
make a significant difference in the levels of emissions, and there is not a
sufficient mechanism to enact regulatory environmental change at the
international level. Therefore, since federal climate change legislation is
likely the best available option for climate change activists, it is helpful to
review previous federal legislation.
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The 1970s saw a wave of wide-ranging pollution control legislation.21
For example, in 1975, the Department of Transportation set standards for
automobile emissions, in accordance with the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act.22 In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act
significantly changed the standards for automobile emissions.23 Under these
standards, both passenger automobiles and light trucks manufactured in the
United States must achieve an average of thirty-five miles per gallon.24
The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 established
efficiency standards for appliances and other equipment and gave the
Department of Energy the authority to set new standards for energy
compliance for several consumer products.25 These standards reduced fossil
fuel emissions by 1.7% in 2000, and could triple those benefits by 2020.26
In 1992, about half of the states adopted the most current regulations,
concerning emissions from buildings, under the Energy Policy Act, making
buildings more energy efficient.27 Because 40% of greenhouse gas emissions
come from buildings, the regulations greatly reduced the amount of
greenhouse gas emissions.28
Similarly, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 greatly increased the amount
of biofuels and renewable resources imported into the United States.29 The
Energy Independence and Security Act was signed into law in 2007 and was
intended to improve energy efficiency in lighting, appliances, and
buildings.30 Title IV of the Act required that by 2015, federal buildings
reduce total energy use by 30%.31
Although a renewed push for national climate legislation is underway,
many past attempts at the federal level to pass new regulations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions have failed.32 While most of the proposed bills
would have provided short-term change, only a handful would have created
lasting environmental benefits.33
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B. State Legislative Efforts
Most of the current efforts to combat climate change are occurring at
the state level.34 California has emerged as the leader in legislative efforts to
combat climate change.35 Recently, the California legislature passed a bill
that seeks to reduce emissions by 25% by 2020, creating new standards for
several large local industries.36 California’s efforts to reduce emissions by
motor vehicles is one of the most significant efforts in the nation, as it
endeavors to reduce emissions from light-duty cars by 18% in 2020 and by
27% in 2030.37 Ten states have committed to adopting California’s standards
once they become effective.38
Several northeastern states have also adopted a cap-and-trade
program.39 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, and Vermont have implemented legislation to cap emissions at
their 2009 level and to reduce emissions by 10% in 2019.40 Both Oregon and
Washington have adopted emissions caps for new power plants, though
plants need only comply with some of the program’s requirements in order
to be certified.41 New Hampshire and Massachusetts have emissions caps for
existing plants, with current offsets and carbon trading available in the
future.42
Several states take less conventional approaches. Twenty-two states
now require that a certain percent of energy revenue come from qualifying
renewable energy, contributing to energy diversity in those states.43 The
percentage required for compliance, however, varies significantly from state
to state.44 Additionally, at least seventeen states have established plans to
stabilize greenhouse gas emission levels at 2010 levels by 2020.45 Several
states have also filed litigation to reduce emissions.46 Several northeastern
34.
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states, that are leaders of state climate change initiatives, have adopted the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives (“RGGI”).47 These states have agreed
upon a regional limit for fossil-fuel-fired energy generation.48 The overall
cap is modest, and there is a phase-in period.49
While states have made a great deal of headway in passing climate
change legislation, more action is needed. Again, state action alone is
unlikely to sufficiently address problems with climate change.50 Since the
United States has chosen not to participate in the Kyoto Protocol,51 more
activists are looking to the federal level for implementing new legislation.52
As both state and federal legislation can be inefficient in accomplishing
the goals of climate change legislation, advocates should consider other
avenues for instituting change. One of those avenues is litigation.
IV. LITIGATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LEGISLATION
In some instances, federal legislation either moves too slowly or is not
very effective. This section explores two cases effecting climate change (one
at the national level and one at the supranational level) and concludes that, to
an extent, litigation can be a valid alternative to climate change legislation.53
Although neither of the cases discussed herein utilized the doctrine of public
nuisance, some courts have used this doctrine to combat climate change.
Massachusetts v. EPA involved twelve states as petitioners.54 The
petitioners asked the court to determine “whether the EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles,
and, if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so [were] consistent
with the statute.”55 The United States Supreme Court held that the Clean Air
Act (Air Pollution Control Act)56 provided the EPA with authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, and that the EPA could not refuse to enforce such
standards.57 The Court held that “[t]he harms associated with climate change
47.
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are serious and well recognized”58 and cited a rise in global sea levels as
evidence of the harms.59 This case is one example where litigation has
produced a significant difference in federal climate change law by mandating
that the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
One interesting example of climate change litigation was filed by the
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (“ICC”), which represents Inuits living in the
Arctic, against the United States.60 The ICC cuts though several national
borders, including the United States, Russia, Greenland, and Canada.61 The
petition was filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“the Commission”), a regional, national organization. The petition claimed
that greenhouse gas emissions violated rights articulated in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.62 As such, the Commission
applied supranational human rights law, relying in part upon other
supranational law.63
The reason this litigation is worth consideration is because it takes place
on an international level. In the international context, successful litigation
could produce results on a larger scale than legislation, which cannot exceed
national boundaries.64 Of course, transnational litigation produces many
potential problems. Even if corporate greenhouse gas emissions are illegal
internationally, no global governing body exists to enforce new standards.65
The very existence of authority that regulates corporations emanates from the
authority of individual countries.66
Though the Inuits’ petition was later rejected, there are several
important lessons to be learned from the suit.67 The petitioners in that case
knew they did not have the necessary enforcement mechanism to make the
United States reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, though they did hope
to bring widespread attention to their cause. Even though one country’s
pollution might affect humanity on a global level, no bodies exist on the
supranational level to force countries to comply. Obviously, in the event that
any sort of international governing body (or international organization that
has a mechanism to enforce legislation) develops, litigation would be a way
to enforce the greatest amount of change quickly. Such an organization does
not appear likely in the near future. Although no enforcement mechanism
58.
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exists at the supranational level, however, the Massachusetts v. EPA case
illustrates that significant, lasting change at the federal level can be
implemented through litigation.
Considering legislation and litigation separately would likely leave a
discussion of climate change incomplete. A more holistic approach to
climate change involves cooperative federalism.
V. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Some have advocated for a cooperative approach between states and
the federal government in dealing with climate change, claiming that state
and federal legislation can complement each other.68 A criticism of this
approach is that it is difficult for the affected industry to comply, thereby
passing additional costs onto the consumer.69 This problem could likely be
solved by “modified federalism,” in which only two standards are created.70
Though it would be mandatory for all states to comply with the federal
climate change regulations, each state could choose whether to adopt a
second, more stringent set of regulations (also called “floor preemption”).71
Therefore, any affected industry would only have two or three sets of
regulations to choose from, rather than fifty.
In the past, other major federal regulations, such as the Clean Air Act,
have utilized the “modified federalism approach.”72 Congress allowed some
states to waive compliance with a stricter standard, while still complying with
the underlying federal regulation.73 California hoped to establish cooperative
federalism to pass stricter state legislation, in order to bypass the federal
legislative process.74 The text of the Clean Air Act provided that the
Administrator of the EPA was required to deny California the waiver only if
the Administrator found that: (1) California’s determination that its
regulations were at least as stringent as federal regulation was not arbitrary
and capricious, (2) California did not need separate standards to meet
“compelling and extraordinary reasons” and (3) California’s standards for
vehicle emissions were inconsistent with federal standards.75 In 1977,
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Congress allowed other states to choose whether to comply with California’s
standards instead of the national standards.76
Not all attempts at cooperative federalism have been successful. On
July 22, 2002, former California Governor Grey Davis signed the Pavely Bill
into law, which would have allowed the California Air Resource Board to
regulate vehicle emissions.77 In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the Supreme
Court determined that the authority to regulate automobile emissions rested
within the sole purview of the EPA.78 At the end of 2007, the EPA denied
California’s exemption from the Clean Air Act for the Pavely Bill, noting that
greenhouse gas emissions were a “global problem” and therefore any remedy
should only be addressed at the federal level.79
In 2009, the Administrator of the EPA issued its Endangerment Finding,
stating that greenhouse gases endangered the public’s health.80 Although the
finding itself did not impose any new regulations on industries, issuing the
finding was a prerequisite for implementing additional emissions regulations
for vehicles.81
In 2013, the EPA issued an initiative to develop regulations to control
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.82 The EPA derives its authority
to impose these standards under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act for the
federal government and under section 111(d) for state governments.83 Under
this proposal the nation will “continue to rely on a diverse mix of energy
sources, including efficient natural gas, clean coal technology, nuclear power,
and renewable energy like wind and solar.”84 The standards imposed for
existing power plants are expected to be less stringent than the standards for
new plants.85
Even though cooperative federalism might be an interesting alternative
for advocates of climate change legislation, it is likely dead for the time
being. Because Massachusetts v. EPA likely precludes delegation of
environmental regulation to state agencies, it appears that the best option for
lasting regulation is at the federal level. However, there are many obstacles
that need to be overcome to enact any major federal legislation and climate
change is no exception.
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VI. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION
As mentioned earlier, time is not costless in the context of global
warming,86 and the time-sensitive nature of climate change requires that its
proponents be proactive.87 In order to make up for lost time, future
technological advances must achieve exponentially greater reductions than
what we are currently achieving.88 In other words, the longer we put off the
problem, the harder it will be to fix.
The time-sensitivity problem is exacerbated by the fact that our
legislative system was intentionally designed for lawmaking to take place
slowly and deliberately.89 Our lawmaking system is also built upon
bargaining and compromise, which is not always the best option for climate
change legislation advocates.90 The complex and widespread distribution of
greenhouse gas emissions also undermines the likelihood of a powerful
political coalition pushing through meaningful legislation, and those in
opposition of additional legislation would likely be well-funded.91 Those
drafting climate change legislation must be creative in order to create
solutions to these complex problems.
It has been argued that delay in the context of climate change legislation
is cheaper in the long-term, because in the interim, technology has the
potential to make significant headway and greatly reduce costs.92
Furthermore, wouldn’t it be possible for increases in technology to
completely solve any future Malthusian crises that might arise, climate
change included? Because of the absence of market signals to indicate the
development of climate change technology in the distant future, the outcome
of this argument is uncertain.93 Obviously, it is foolhardy to simply do
nothing about climate change in the hopes of it solving itself in the future
because of the potential catastrophic consequences if we are wrong.
A second major problem in passing climate change legislation is that
the actors who can most easily address climate change are not only the ones
who contributed the most to the problem, but are also the ones who have the
least incentive to address it.94 Major polluters have little profit motivation,
without government intervention, to make any headway dealing with climate
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change.95 Even on a global scale, many powerful nations choose not to
address climate change in order to stay economically competitive.96
Additionally, even though some parts of the world will quickly suffer
dramatic consequences, other parts of the world will suffer few short-term
consequences.97 This reduces the incentives for the unaffected parts of the
world to act even further.98 A third problem appears to be no existing
governmental framework to address a problem with such a large temporal
and spatial scope.99
The easiest answer to these problems lies in advocating for climate
change regulation on the federal level. First, passage on the federal level
would allow for a new “floor,” so states would not have to worry about losing
business to other states by passing new regulations.100 Although the federal
government could also pass a “ceiling,” which might be the preferred option
for corporations, some environmentalists oppose passing ceilings because it
would preempt the passage of additional state regulations.101 Second, the
drafters of the legislation could include emission-trading programs in order
to make the legislation more palatable for businesses.102 The importance of
forming well-organized interest groups must also be stressed.103 If climate
change activists wish to impact the legislative process, it is imperative that
they pool their resources together in order to match the private sector’s
influence.104
It is also possible that the private sector might push for climate change
regulation at the federal level if it has enough incentive because in some
instances regulation at the state level has prompted action at the federal level.
The U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a co-operative group of businesses and
environmental organizations, has stated: “We believe local, state, regional
and federal programs can and must be complementary. The aim is to achieve
compatibility and avoid conflicts between local, state and federal programs
that unnecessarily drive up compliance costs and make achieving our
nation’s environmental goals more difficult.”105
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One way to provide an incentive for industry is to only regulate
products, instead of “end-of-pipe” pollution, at the state level.106 End-of pipe
pollution consists of “[m]ethods used to remove already formed
contaminants from a stream of air, water, waste, product or similar
[channels]. These techniques are called ‘end-of-pipe’ as they are normally
implemented as a last stage of a process before the stream is disposed of or
delivered.”107 The private sector is more likely to push back against product
regulations because product regulation could effectively push a business out
of an entire market.108 End-of-pipe pollution regulation allows an affected
industry considerably more leeway.109 As such, states increase the chance
that the private sector will appeal to the federal government when they
engage in product regulation.110
If many states began passing inconsistent regulations, this might also
create enough legislative uncertainty for a corporate push for climate change
legislation as a defensive mechanism.111 This has happened at least three
times so far. When Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act
of 1965, at least in part due to industry concerns, the private sector helped
push for the passage of the Air Quality Act of 1967 to preempt new state
legislation.112 The private sector acted in a similar way regarding the acid
rain provisions in the Clean Air Act.113 Industry sees scenarios such as these
as a means to pass a federal regulatory ceiling in order to “pick off” states
with the highest amount of regulation and preempt other states from enacting
similar legislation.114 Indeed, climate change advocates often are leery of the
legislation advocated by various industries because even when an industry is
advocating for additional legislation, it is still serving its own interests.115
One interesting problem in climate change legislation involves
protecting the impoverished from higher utility and product costs.116
Increased environmental regulations are likely to drive up the cost of some
types of goods,117 which in turn might drive some Americans deeper into

106. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1506-07.
107. End-of-pipe Techniques, GREENFACTS, http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/def/end-of-pipetechniques.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
108. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1507–08.
109. Id. at 1508.
110. Id. at 1509.
111. Id. at 1509.
112. Id. at 1512.
113. Id. at 1536.
114. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 7, at 1532.
115. Andreen, supra note 32, at 267.
116. ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SHARON PARROTT & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, DESIGNING CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION THAT SHIELDS LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS FROM INCREASED POVERTY AND HARDSHIP 10 (2008), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-25-07climate.pdf.
117. Id.
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poverty.118 The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities devised a twopronged system to address this problem.119 The first prong involves giving a
“climate-change rebate” to low-income households through the alreadyexisting general electronic benefit transfer120 (“E.B.T.”) system, in
combination with tax relief through the Earned Income Tax Credit.121 Under
the second prong, low-income Americans would have their income
supplemented by an increase in the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance
Program.122 It remains to be seen whether such a program would be effective,
but climate change advocates must be cognizant of how additional legislation
affects the impoverished.
Although many obstacles in the path of climate change legislation may
seem difficult to overcome, it is important to remember that sometimes an
obstacle can be transformed into a catalyst for change. Understanding the
unique problems that climate change legislation faces can prepare educated
citizens to address such problems during the legislative process.
VII. THE FUTURE FOR FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION
Proponents of state legislation proffer several arguments regarding the
need for state legislation in addition to federal legislation. First, individual
states, rather than the federal government, are more likely to address their
unique concerns.123 Furthermore, the United States government has not been
proactive in drafting new climate change legislation.124 Finally, the United
States Congress generally uses state legislation as a measuring post,
expanding on plans that states already enacted.
The need for federal climate change legislation, as opposed to state
legislation, can hardly be called into question. State legislation is generally
unable to address problems at the national level.125 State legislation creates
the problem of “free riders,” where states seek to benefit from the increased
environmental protection offered in other states, without spending any of the
associated costs.126 Some states also likely have different “costs” associated
with different problems, and thus legislate in some areas but not others.127
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. EBT, USDA (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.fns.usda.gov/ebt/general-electronic-benefit-transfer-ebtinformation.
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Additionally, many types of pollution that affect climate change are not
within the boundaries of any one state.128 For example, a river might run
through many states, and all states share the same air.
Aside from the aforementioned problems, there are other reasons why
regulation on the federal level would be more economical. Federal
legislation would force states to consider interests outside of their own
jurisdiction.129 It is also more efficient for the federal government to spend
money on technology and research, instead of several states spending the
resources to do the same thing.130 Furthermore, the federal government has
more resources to spend on technology and research than individual states.131
Finally, if the federal government adopted a cap-and-trade program, a larger
market would lower costs and allow for more market fluidity.132
Perhaps the reason that climate change legislation has been more
difficult to pass recently is that the American public remains skeptical.
Justice Scalia no doubt captured many Americans’ feelings on the subject
when he said that he was “not a scientist” and further stated, “that’s why I
don't want to have to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.”133
Public opinion on climate change legislation might be difficult to sway
because most climate change legislation asks for increasing short-term cost
in exchange for long-term benefits, many of which are difficult to measure.134
Dealing with climate change legislation is a daunting task, and one that
requires a great deal of time and energy. Of course, this is not the first time
that many assumed future climate change legislation in the United States has
a bleak outlook.135 Indeed, the legislative “moment” that spurred Barack
Obama’s election to presidency may foreshadow things to come, in terms of
federal climate change legislation. President Obama has renewed talks to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as he made it a large part of his campaign
for reelection.136 He also appointed a “Climate Czar” to address the matter
and issued a memorandum to the EPA, directing the agency to revisit past
decisions on climate change.137
One of the most important problems facing climate change legislation
is that, even should sweeping legislation pass, the political climate is so
volatile that it is possible that significant pieces of any legislation could be
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repealed.138 Even apart from inevitable ideological swings in our
congressional makeup, many members of Congress could see climate change
legislation as an easy target in times of budgetary crisis.139 Should any
amount of significant climate change reform from Congress come to fruition
in the near future, environmentalists should consider which strategies to
employ in order to ensure that any new legislation would be lasting.140
Perhaps the key to lasting climate change legislation is drafting statutes
to be flexible, because flexibility would necessarily allow the law to change
with evolving environmental standards.141 Flexibility is necessary because
of climate change’s “temporal and spatial reach”; however, the legislation
must also be steadfast enough to be maintained over the long term.142 Robin
Kundis Craig, a Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law,
claims that flexibility alone in drafting legislation is not enough to ensure that
the proponents of environmental legislation maintain versatile legislation,
but that environmentalists must adopt a “principled flexibility.”143 This
would mean that
both the law and the regulators (1) distinguish in legally significant ways
uncontrollable climate change impacts from controllable anthropogenic
impacts on species, resources, and ecosystems that can and should be
actively managed and regulated, and (2) implement consistent principles for
an overall climate change adaptation strategy, even though the application
of those principles in particular locations in response to specific climate
change impacts will necessarily encompass a broad and creative range of
adaptation decisions and actions.144

A “precommitment strategy” is one employed to take a decision away from
oneself in the future.145 Lasting climate change legislation should include
precommitment strategies, which would make it very difficult (but never
impossible) to change the legislation in response to certain kinds of
concerns.146 Furthermore, the legislation should contain other
precommitment strategies that make it easier to change to the law in response
to longer-term concerns, thus ensuring the legislation’s viability.147 Another
option would be to include strong financial incentives for businesses to
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support the legislation (such as an emissions trading program), which would
make it less likely that the private sector would seek changes in the law.148 It
is also likely that any sweeping climate change legislation would need to
include programs which would alleviate the potentially serious adverse
economic effects of implementing sweeping environmental reform, in order
to ensure both the passage of the bill and our country’s continued economic
livelihood.149 Another potential strategy would be to engage in clever
drafting techniques to insulate climate change legislation from potentially
fatal unpopular earmarks.150
The United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, headed by Barbara Boxer, released its own guidelines for passing
climate change legislation in 2009, some of which mirror the
recommendations discussed above by legal scholars. These “principles”
recommended to reduce emissions to levels guided by science to avoid
climate change,151 set short and long term emissions targets that are certain
and enforceable, with periodic review of the climate science and adjustments
to targets and policies as necessary to meet emissions reduction targets,152
ensure that state and local entities continue pioneering efforts to address
global warming,153 establish a transparent and accountable market-based
system that efficiently reduces carbon emissions,154 and use revenues from
the carbon market in order to accomplish various objectives, such as keeping
consumers.155 Furthermore, as the United States shifts to using additional
green energy, we should invest in clean energy technology and measures to
produce efficient energy, assist states and local areas to adopt ways to
sufficiently address global warming, take economic measures to assist
businesses in transitioning to green energy, conserve wildlife threatened by
climate change, and work with the international community in order to ensure
that other countries also develop lasting efforts to combat climate change.156
Finally, the United States should provide intentional incentives so that other
countries will contribute to the fight against climate change.157
The Natural Resource Defense Council, a large environmental activist
group, has called for similar initiatives for climate change legislation by:
promoting investment in energy efficiency and green energy, setting a cap on
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greenhouse gas emissions, building on existing climate change legislation at
the federal and state levels, and supporting international efforts to curb
climate change.158
The White House’s website offers an additional set of goals for enacting
global warming legislation.159 The first goal is to develop and secure
America’s energy resources by producing safe domestic gas and oil and by
increasing America’s energy independence.160 Second, America should
provide consumers with choices to reduce costs and save energy, by ensuring
that the United States produces more efficient cars, trucks, homes, buildings,
and factories.161 Finally, legislation should ensure that we are able to continue
to support developing new technology.162
Even if environmentalists are unable to pass climate change legislation
in the near future, it is likely that eventually America will experience another
legislative “moment” in which to pass additional greenhouse gas emissions
regulations. When that time comes, environmentalists need a strategy to
make sure the regulations will be lasting and effective. In order to do this,
the legislation should involve precommitment strategies and be flexible
enough to adapt to changes. While it is a good idea for environmentalists to
organize their agenda by putting forth “principles,” these principles will not
do much good if future legislation is unable to withstand the passage of time.
As far as content is concerned, future climate legislation should include
international incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, insulate some
of the effects of passing additional regulation from the private sector, and
build on existing regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although many states have made significant efforts towards climate
change mitigation and adaptation, it is unlikely that states can make much of
a difference on the global scale. Furthermore, there exists no mechanism at
the international level to implement changes. The most efficient way to make
major policy changes is at the federal level, yet there are several major
problems with enacting lasting climate change legislation; the longer we
delay addressing climate change, the more difficult it will be to address the
problem in the future. Obviously, this problem can be overcome by acting
immediately.
158. We Cannot Wait Any Longer to Put Our Nation on a Path to Cleaner Energy, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/legislation/senate.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
159. Advancing American Energy, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securingamerican-energy#clean energy (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.

248

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

Climate change legislation is opposed by corporations (with notable
exceptions, such as the U.S. Climate Action Partnership), which have a great
deal of financial resources and political influence. Perhaps the easiest way
to spur corporations to join with environmentalists in order to pass additional
climate change legislation is for states to pass inconsistent regulation.
Passing inconsistent regulations create market uncertainty, thereby
incentivizing corporations to pass “ceiling” regulations in order to preempt
arbitrary environmental standards.
However, even if environmentalists are able to pass federal climate
change legislation, then it must be both effective and lasting. Perhaps the
best way to accomplish this is to include precommitment strategies and make
the legislation flexible enough to withstand political change. Any additional
climate change regulations should likely include incentives for the
intentional community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, build on existing
federal and state legislation, and insulate the private sector against some of
the effects of passing sweeping environmental legislation. Assuming that
Congress is unable to pass climate change legislation in the immediate future,
environmentalists should know ways to pass effective and lasting legislation
for the next legislative “moment.”

